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I. INTRODUCTION

The 1988-89 United States Supreme Court term led many to believe
that the judiciary's attitude toward affirmative action had taken a dramatic conservative shift, causing litigants thereafter to deal with a new3
Protection,
conservative Court.' Whether the issue is Title VII,2 Equal
4
that it will
is
feeling
the
discrimination,
on
attack
of
kind
or any other
be more difficult for employees to prove, and easier for employers to
practice, subtle forms of discrimination.

1 See Kamer, Rights Groups Plan Hill Counterattack,The Washington Post,
June 17, 1989, at A4, col. 1.
2Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1982), which
provides that it shall be unlawful for an employer to discriminate on the basis
of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. See Wards Cove Packing Co. v.
Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115, 2124 (1989) (where the Court held that in disparateimpact cases, the employee has the burden of isolating and identifying specific
employment practices that are allegedly responsible for any statistical disparaties, but the employer can rebut with evidence of business justification).
3 U.S. CONST. amend. V (equal protection component applied to the federal
government under Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954)) and U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 1 (as applied to the states). See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488
U.S. 469 (1989).
4See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989) (litigation
under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 covers discrimination in the initial hiring process, but
not discriminatory treatment on the job). See also Martin v. Wilks, 109 S. Ct.
2180 (1989) (white firefighters not parties to prior civil rights litigation held not
precluded from challenging, as discriminatory, promotion decisions made pursuant to prior litigation's consent decrees).
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One type of controversial affirmative action plan is the minority setaside program.5 Set-asides were instituted by various governmental agencies in an attempt to alleviate the effects of past discrimination in the
government contracting process.6 This Note will focus on the future of
these plans in the wake of the recent Supreme Court decision, City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. 7 The conclusion is that City of Richmond
was rightly decided as this country moves into the 1990's and seeks to
achieve the goal of true racial equality.
First, an examination of the background of affirmative action leading
up to set-asides is in order. Second, this Note will analyze City of Richmond and the constitutional and social issues at stake, balancing whether
minority set-asides are needed with the recognition that discrimination
and lack of economic opportunity for minorities still exists in our society.
Finally, the Note will examine several lower court cases in which judges
have already begun to apply the City of Richmond analysis. It will become
apparent that "strict" set-asides are not the answer to achieving social
and economic equality. Race-neutral methods will be the wave of the
future, since this decision will force government agencies to reevaluate
and redefine their programs. The lower court cases examined are just the
beginning of the application of the new principles. It will take several
years to realize the full impact of City of Richmond, but it appears that
the future is bleak for minority set-aside programs.
II. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND SET-ASIDES BEFORE City of Richmond

In order to understand the Supreme Court's view of minority set-aside
programs, it is important to review the three leading cases which laid
the framework for the City of Richmond decision. These cases are Regents
of the University of California v. Bakke, 8 Fullilove v. Klutznick,9 and
Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education.o The Court's decisions in these
three cases developed and refined the legal doctrines surrounding the
current view of affirmative action and set-asides.

, Minority set-aside programs can be described as government programs that
'require federal agencies to remove individual contracts
and classes of contracts
from the open competitive system and 'set them aside' for restricted bidding."'

Lowry, Set-Aside Programs: Viable Vehicles for Change or Threats to the Free
EnterpriseSystem, in SELECTED AFFIRMATIVE ACTION Topics IN EMPLOYMENT AND

U.S. Commission on Civil Rights 110 (March 1985) (quoting
Assoc. Gen. Contractors of Am.).
6While it is true that government set-aside programs assist many different
types of minority businesses, this Note will focus specifically on the construction
industry. This industry in particular has a history of documented racially discriminatory practices. See generally Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
488 U.S. 469 (1989).
11438 U.S. 265 (1978).
9 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
"0476 U.S. 267 (1986).
SET-ASIDES, VOL 1.,
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Affirmative action plans designed to hire and promote minorities took
root in the early 1960's and were strengthened during President Johnson's
administration.1 Initially, lower courts had upheld race-conscious plans
12
designed to remedy past discrimination. However, affirmative action
seemed to suffer a setback after Bakke. Justice Powell, writing the key
opinion, interpreted the Equal Protection Clause as a guarantee which
"cannot mean one thing when applied to one individual and something
3
else when applied to a person of another color."' He concluded that racial
and ethnic classifications of any sort were suspect and subject to the most
rigorous judicial scrutiny.14
for admission
The plaintiff in Bakke, a white male, was twice rejected
1
to the University of California-Davis Medical School. " The size of the
entering class was set at 100 students, with 16 seats being set aside for
"disadvantaged" applicants."1 In essence, the non-disadvantaged students
could only compete for the 84 regular admission slots, while disadvan17
taged students could compete for all 100 slots. As the program was being

administered, the only "disadvantaged" applicants accepted were members of designated minority groups."' Bakke challenged the school's program, claiming racial discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection
Clause. 19
20
Justice Powell declared the special admissions program invalid and
He
school.
found that Bakke should have been admitted to the medical
unless
concluded that classifications based on race were impermissible
21
the state had a substantial governmental interest. Here, because the
admission program was not the result of past judicial findings, and the
school could not identify particular instances of discrimination on its part,
discrimination"
Powell found no compelling interest. Remedying "societal
22
was not a sufficient basis for a racial set-aside. Powell did remark,
however, that while race can be a factor in an affirmative action policy,
11See generally Jones, The Originsof Affirmative Action, in STUDY GROUP ON
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION TO THE COMM. ON EDUCATION AND LABOR 100th CONG., 1st
SESS, Report 175-82 (Comm. Print 1986).
12

See Note, An Examination of the Legality and Constitutionality of Race-

Conscious Affirmative Action, 33 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 315, 318 n.14
(1988).
13Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 289-90 (1978).
14

Id. at 291. The Court considered a preferential admissions program for mi-

norities in law school in DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974). Even though

the case was not decided on its merits (the Court determined the issue was moot
since the petitioner, who claimed discrimination, had been ordered admitted to
law school by the lower court, and was near graduation), Justice Douglas suggested strict scrutiny should be used to evaluate even benign classifications. Id.
at 333.
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 276-77.
11
16Id. at 274-75.
17 Id. at 289.
"'Bakke, 438 U.S. at 276.
19Id. at 278.
20Id. at 320.
interests
21 Id. at 305. Justice Powell was careful to note that legitimate state
will always include ameliorating the effects of past, identified discrimination,
such as in the school desegregation cases. Id. at 307.
22 Id.
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it cannot be the sole factor. 23 In contrast, Justices Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun found the program constitutionally sound, establishing their view that "racial classifications are not per se invalid under

the Fourteenth Amendment. ' ' 24 Adopting a strict level of scrutiny, these

Justices found that remedying societal discrimination was an important
governmental objective, 25 and using racial classifications was a means
substantially related to that objective.26 Finally, Justice Stevens, along
with Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart and Rehnquist, agreed
that Bakke should have been admitted to the medical school. However,
these Justices felt the case should have been decided under Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, without need to reach the constitutional
27
issues.

After Bakke, affirmative action once again gained strength in Fullilove
v. Klutznick.28 Fullilove was a challenge to the federal Public Works Employment Act of 1977,29 specifically the constitutionality of the section of
the Act pertaining to "minority business enterprises" (MBEs).3 0 This section required that ten percent of money received from federal grants for
local public works projects must be awarded to minority-owned businesses. 3' Minorities were defined as Negroes, Spanish-speaking people,
Orientals, Indians, Eskimos, and Aleuts. 32 A total or partial waiver was
permitted in the event the contractor could not meet the ten percent
requirement after a good faith effort.33 Various associations of contractors
and subcontractors filed suit alleging that the provision on its face violated the Equal Protection Clause of the fourteenth amendment and the
Due Process Clause of the fifth amendment.2 4
The ten percent set-aside was upheld, with the Justices splitting into
several blocs. Chief Justice Burger delivered an opinion joined by Justices
White and Powell. Noting first that Congress had the power to enact such
legislation as an exercise of the Spending Power,35 Burger determined
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 320.
Id. at 356 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 362.
26
Id. at 376-77.
25

27

Id. at 411 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Our settled

practice ... is to avoid the decision of a constitutional issue if a case can be fairly
decided on a statutory ground"). These Justices concluded that deciding whether
race can ever be used as a factor in an admissions decision was not an issue in
the case.
2 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
Pub. L. No. 95-28, 91 Stat. 116, which amended the Local Public Works
Capital Development and Investment Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-369, 90 Stat.
999, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6701-6736 (1982). Essentially, the Act permitted the Secretary
of Commerce to make grants to any state or local government for construction
or improvement of local public works projects. Id. at § 6702(a). The Act also

provided that construction projects shall be awarded to the lowest bidder meeting
established criteria. Id. at § 6705(e)(1).
30 Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 453-54 (1980).
32 Pub. L. No. 95-28, 91 Stat. 116, 103(f)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 6705(f)(2) (1982).
32

Id.

' Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 469-71.

-Id. at 455.
s U.S. CONST.

art. I, § 8. cl. 1.
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that the legislature had abundant evidence of past discrimination in
public contracting. 6 Next, he found that the congressional program was
sufficiently narrowly tailored to achieve the goal of remedying the effects
of such discrimination because of the waiver provision as well as administrative mechanisms that ensured only bona fide MBEs were included
firms,
in the program.3 7 Finally, while there was a burden on non-minority
38
actually
Without
light.
relatively
was
burden
this
that
Burger concluded
identifying the level of scrutiny used, Burger and White concluded that
Works Emthe remedial measures adopted by Congress in the Public
9
ployment Act of 1977 did not violate the Constitution.
On the other hand, Justice Powell wrote separately and used strict
scrutiny, finding that Congress had a compelling governmental interest
40
in redressing identified discrimination against minority contractors, and
remof
the means chosen were reasonably necessary to achieve the goal
41
history
edying past discrimination. Powell concluded that legislative
showed Congress, in enacting the MBE provision, had identified past
42
discrimination based upon extensive findings. Taking a different stance,
that, in general, govagreed
Blackmun
and
43
Justices Marshall, Brennan
are subject to strict scrutiny,
ernment classifications based upon race

but they emphasized that an exception must be made for government
programs employing racial classifications for remedial purposes. These
Justices contended that such programs should be subject to only intermediate scrutiny-the government objective must be important and the
this standmeans must be substantially related to that objective." Under
5
constitutional.4
found
be
course
of
would
set-aside
ard, the
Justices Stewart and Rehnquist, joining in a dissenting opinion, deto race is "inherclared that any official action that classifies according
'46
provision in
MBE
The
ently suspect and presumptively invalid.
36Fullilove, 448

U.S. at 477-78. Chief Justice Burger noted the extensive

congressional hearings surrounding the passage of the Act. Id. at 453-72. At the
same time, however, he pointed out that Congress could legislate without making
the extensive findings required of a judicial or administrative proceeding. Id. at
478.
37 Id. at 481-82.
38"[T]he 10% minimum minority business participation contemplated by this
program would account for only 0.25% of the annual expenditure for construction
work in the United States." Id. at 484, n.72.

39Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 491-92.
41 Id. at 507 (Powell, J., concurring).
41Id. at 515 (Powell, J., concurring). In concluding that the means were necessary, Justice Powell weighed five considerations: 1) alternative remedies had
been tried and were unsuccessful; 2) the MBE provision was not a permanent
part of the federal contracting requirements; 3) the 10% figure chosen was reasonable, falling roughly between the percentage of contractors that are minorities
and the percentage of total population that is minority; 4) the program included
a waiver provision; and, 5) the burden on innocent third parties was minimal.
Id. at 511-14.
42

Id. at 503.

Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 517-18 (Marshall, J., concurring).
"Id. at 519.
4

"Id.

16Id. at 523 (Stewart, J., dissenting).

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1990

5

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:3

question was found to be discriminatory on its face since it preferred
members of one group over members in another solely because of race.
Justice Stevens in his dissenting opinion concluded that the MBE provision was not a narrowly tailored remedial measure.4 7 His analysis suggested that he would likely vote to strike down most legislative minority
set-aside programs.
After Fullilove, lower courts struggled to analyze minority set-aside
plans in the wake of the latest word from the Supreme Court. 48 Wygant
v. Jackson Board of Education49 one of the next affirmative action cases
accepted for review by the nation's highest court, helped the movement
toward strict scrutiny for all racial classifications.50 Wygant concerned an
attack by white teachers against a layoff policy instituted by the Jackson,
Michigan Board of Education that allowed white teachers with more
seniority to be laid off in lieu of minority teachers with less seniority.5'

47Id. at 537-41 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens was concerned
that
the remedy must bear a rational relationship to the extent of the harm it was
intended to cure. The remedy here was much broader than necessary to remedy
any past wrong because it included groups that may have never been victimized
by racial discrimination. Id.
48 See South Fla. Chapter of the Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. Metropolitan Dade County, 723 F.2d 846 (11th Cir. 1984) (court upheld county minority set-aside program finding a legitimate objective of remedying past
discrimination coupled with means that were sufficiently narrowly tailored); Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. City and County of San Francisco, 813 F.2d
922 (9th Cir. 1987) (municipal ordinance that gave bidding preference to minority
owned business struck down because no finding of prior discrimination by the
city nor were the means narrowly tailored); Ohio Contractors Ass'n v. Keip, 713
F.2d 167 (6th Cir. 1983) (state statute allowing minority set-asides upheld because
of sufficient findings of past discrimination and the statute was sufficiently narrow
in scope to comply with Fullilove); J. Edinger & Son, Inc. v. City of Louisville,
802 F.2d 213 (6th Cir. 1986) (municipal ordinance giving preference to minorityowned businesses struck down because statistical evidence to support alleged past
discrimination was insufficient); Michigan Road Builders Ass'n v. Milliken, 834
F.2d 583 (6th Cir. 1987) (lack of evidence to support past identified discrimination
compelled court to strike down state set-aside program).
49476 U.S. 267 (1986).
- Wygant is discussed because it was decided on Equal Protection grounds and
because the Supreme Court, on remand, ordered the Fourth Circuit to reconsider
City of Richmond in light of Wygant. Of course, the Supreme Court had decided
other affirmative action cases around the same time as Wygant. See Firefighters
Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984) (struck down layoff plan that
discharged white firefighters who were not responsible for past discrimination);
Local No. 93, Intl Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501 (1986)
(Title VII did not preclude city from voluntarily entering consent decree benefit-

ting individuals who were not the actual victims of discrimination); Johnson v.
Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987) (affirmative action plan to increase
the number of women in traditionally male positions upheld); Local 28, Sheet
Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421 (1986) (Court affirmed raceconscious remedies imposed by trial judge on union that had been found to have
violated Title VII); United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987) (using Equal
Protection analysis, Court upheld a district court order mandating a one-for-one
promotional quota for black state troopers).
51 Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 272 (1986).
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The Board followed this policy after suit was brought by minority teachers
alleging non-compliance with an agreement between the Board and the
Jackson Education Association. 52 The District Court upheld the racial
preferences outlined in the agreement, finding that the approach was a
permissible remedy for past societal discrimination by providing "role
53
models" for the minority schoolchildren. The Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed.
Justice Powell, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Rehnquist
and O'Connor, found that the layoff policy violated the Equal Protection
Clause. 54 Powell looked to his Bakke and Fullilove opinions and once again
concluded that any classification based on race was inherently suspect
55
and was subject to the most searching examination. Thus, a two-pronged
strict scrutiny analysis provided that the racial classification must be
justified by a compelling governmental interest and the means chosen by
56
the government must be narrowly tailored to achieve its purpose. As in
Bakke, Powell found that alleviating societal discrimination was not a
compelling governmental interest, and he reaffirmed the government
57
agency's lack of authority to remedy past societal discrimination. In
addition, there was no factual finding that the Board itself discriminated
in the past. 58 Keeping in mind that remedial measures may take race
into account, Justice Powell deemed the means chosen by the government
were not sufficiently narrow, since less intrusive measures such as hiring
goals were available. 59 Layoffs created an undue burden on innocent third
parties; "valid hiring goals," even though they may burden some, are not
as harsh and are more evenly spread throughout society.6
Justices Marshall, Brennan and Blackmun dissented. They argued that
layoffs were a permissible way to remedy past discrimination, especially
in this case, since the agreement was ratified by the teachers, eighty
percent of whom were white.6 1 These Justices seemed greatly concerned
with the possibility that requiring an admission of guilt or judicial determination of culpability would dissuade a government agency from

62 The provision in question was part of a collective bargaining agreement
between the Board and the teachers union which provided protection against layoffs for minority teachers. Id. at 270. The state court where the suit was filed
found that the Board had breached its contract with the minority plaintiffs. But
the agreement was upheld even though it effectively discriminated against white
teachers, as a permissible remedy for past societal discrimination. Thus, the Board
adhered to the agreement after the successful suit by the plaintiffs. Id. at 272.
This led to the present action by white teachers.

53Id. at 272-73.
14

Id. at 284. Justice O'Conner did not join in Part IV of the opinion.

Wygant, 476 U.S. at 273-74.
wId. at 274.
57Id. at 276.

mId. at 278.
at 283-84.
-' Id. at 282-83.

59 Id.

1Id. at 299 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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instituting voluntary affirmative action. 62 This view was also expressed
by Justice O'Connor, who stated: "The imposition of a requirement that
public employers make findings that they have engaged in illegal discrimination before they engage in affirmative action programs would
severely undermine public employers' incentive to meet voluntarily their
''
civil rights obligations. 63
Bakke and Wygant show the progression of the Court toward rejecting
remedial programs based solely on race." Fullilove, however, confirmed
the Court's hesitation to overturn an action of Congress designed to remedy racial discrimination. The Court consistantly divided into two factions. Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun felt that an intermediate level
of scrutiny was required for affirmative action plans of all types. Powell,
Burger, Rehnquist and Stewart followed a strict scrutiny analysis for any
classification based on race. The current Supreme Court, with the inclusion of conservative justices Scalia and Kennedy, seemed destined to
strike down the municipal set-aside program in City of Richmond.
III. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.
A. Facts and Opinions
The Supreme Court decided City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. 6 5 in
January 1989. Justice O'Connor, joined in part by Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justices White, Kennedy and Stevens, wrote the majority opinion

62Id.at

304. Justice Marshall emphasized that "formal findings" of past discrimination should not be necessary before an agency adopts an affirmative action
program, nor should any remedial policy be directed only at specific acts of identified discrimination. Id. at 305. Presumably, he takes the position that remedying
societal discrimination is permissible.
Id. at 290 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
The Supreme Court's movement affected how lower courts applied the stricter
standards of scrutiny to minority set-asides. Prior to Wygant, for example in Ohio
Contractors Ass'n v. Keip, 713 F.2d 167 (6th Cir. 1983) and South Florida Chapter
of the Associated Gen. Contractors of America v. Metropolitan Dade County,
Florida, 723 F.2d 846 (11th Cir. 1984), federal courts appeared willing to uphold
minority set-asides. However, the strict scrutiny analysis in Wygant forced courts
to strike down set-asides. Courts found that lesser government agencies were
attempting to remedy societal discrimination (a non-compelling interest), since
they did not sufficiently identify past discrimination. See, e.g., J. Edinger & Son,
Inc. v. City of Louisville, 802 F.2d 213 (6th Cir. 1986) (court found that city had
not identified its own discriminatory practices, but instead was trying to remedy
societal discrimination); Michigan Road Builders Ass'n v. Milliken, 834 F.2d 583
(6th Cir. 1987) (state did not develop evidence of its own discrimination; it did
not have a compelling governmental interest in remedying past societal discrimination); Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. City and County of San Francisco,
813 F.2d 922 (9th Cir. 1987) (court concluded city had no proof of its own discrimination; thus, its set-aside must have been an attempt to remedy societal
discrimination).
488 U.S. 469 (1989).
https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol38/iss3/6
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which struck down Richmond, Virginia's minority set-aside program. Using the Wygant analysis, O'Connor concluded that the city's program
violated the Equal Protection Clause because it had instituted a loosely
defined plan without sufficiently identifying the need for remedial action.r
The Richmond City Council had passed a minority set-aside ordinance
which required all non-minority prime contractors that received municdollar
ipal construction contracts to award at least thirty percent of the
67
value of subcontracts to Minority Business Enterprises (MBEs).

Minor-

ities were defined as blacks, Spanish-speaking people, Orientals, Indians,
8
Eskimos, or Aleuts In addition, the plan was described as "remedial in
nature," temporary in duration, and waivable where the prime contractor
could prove that it was unable to obtain thirty percent minority participation. 69 J.A. Croson Company, a white contracting firm, had submitted
a bid on a contract for new plumbing fixtures in the city jail. After attempting to comply with the thirty percent MBE requirement, Croson
10
submitted a waiver application. The city denied the waiver and announced plans to rebid the project. Croson subsequently filed suit, alleging
the ordinance was unconstitutional. The District Court found the plan
was valid and the Fourth Circuit affirmed, following principles laid out
after Wygant,
in Fullilove.71 However, on remand from the Supreme Court
72
the Fourth Circuit reversed, and found the plan invalid. Richmond appealed that decision.
Justice O'Connor, in delivering the opinion, first rebuffed Richmond's
argument that Fullilove controls and thus the city has the power to find
and remedy past discrimination in its local construction industry. Citing
Fullilove, O'Connor reemphasized the broad remedial powers possessed
by Congress.73 But, the fact "[that Congress may identify and redress
the effects of society-wide discrimination does not mean that ...States

and their political subdivisions are free to decide that such remedies are
appropriate. '74 O'Connor did point out that a municipality can take remedial measures if it can prove it had become a "passive participant" in

6Id.

at 511.

67Id. at 477.
68Id.

wId.
70

at 478.

Id. at 482.

71See J.A. Croson Co. v. City of Richmond, 779 F.2d 181 (4th Cir. 1985).
72 See J.A. Croson Co. v. City of Richmond, 822 F.2d 1355 (4th Cir. 1987). This
was typical of lower federal court findings on minority set-asides after Wygant.
See cases cited, supra note 64.
73City of Richmond, 488 U.S. at 488-89. Chief Justice Burger had found this
power both in the Commerce Clause and in § 5 of the fourteenth amendment.

Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 475-76.
14 City of Richmond, 488 U.S. at 490.
Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1990
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past discrimination in its local construction industry.75 As in Wygant,
O'Connor reaffirmed that societal discrimination alone is not a sufficient
compelling governmental interest to warrant set-asides.7 6 It appeared the
thirty percent rigid quota established by the Richmond City Council could
not be tied to any proof of the city's past discrimination. 77 In addition,
O'Connor was concerned about "[tihe gross overinclusiveness of Richmond's racial preference [which] strongly impugns the city's claim of
remedial motivation," 78 as well as the fact that the city had not attempted
race-neutral methods to increase minority participation in the construc79
tion industry.
Justice Stevens approached the problem from a different angle, observing that the Court should be more concerned with the class of persons
benefitted than the standard of review.8 Here, the persons benefitted
could be contractors that have never even been in Richmond, let alone
discriminated against by the city."' Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment as well, underscoring his view that only rare social emergencies
can ever justify a governmental agency making a classification based on
82
race.
As expected, Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan and Blackmun, filed a strong dissent. Marshall reaffirmed his belief that remedial
race-conscious plans should be subject only to intermediate scrutiny. To
him, it was clear that the city had an important interest in eradicating

75

Id. at 492. A "passive participant" would be a government agency, who,
through inaction, permits discrimination to continue in the private sector. Presumably, if the local construction industry is dominated by white-owned businesses that refuse to hire minorities, then a city would have a "compelling
interest" in establishing set-asides. Thus, a city would have a right to interfere
in the private sector to prevent public funds from furthering discriminatory practices. Rosenfeld, DecodingRichmond: Affirmative Action and the Elusive Meaning
of Constitutional Equality, 87 MIcH. L. REV. 1729, 1751-52 (1989). The problem,
of course, is what will be sufficient evidence for the city or state to prove private
discrimination?
In a post-Croson decision, the district court in Washington found that King
County, Washington was a "passive participant" in discrimination in the local
construction industry. Coral Constr. Co. v. King County, 729 F. Supp. 734, 738
(W.D. Wash. 1989). The court determined that evidence supporting King County's
set-aside program was sufficient. That evidence included written or oral descriptions of discrimination. The court concluded that this evidence was not just general
assertions of past discrimination, but was strong evidence of discrimination in
the local construction industry. Id. at 737. Thus, since King County's construction
project dollars flowed through the local construction industry, the county was
found to be a passive participant in any discrimination which could be documented. Id. at 738.
71 City of Richmond, 488 U.S. at 497-98.
" Id.
at 499-500.
78
Id. at 506.
71 Id. at 507. For a discussion of race-neutral methods see infra Section HI.
Id. at 514 (Stevens, J., concurring).
"Id. at 515. The statute places no boundaries on MBEs to be used. Thus,
contractors from all over the United States could compete for the subcontractor
bids. Id. at 478.
2 Id. at 521 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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and preventing reinforcment and perpetuation of past discrimination.
He also felt the set-aside plan was substantially related to the achievement of the city's goal. Richmond had closely followed the Congressional
plan upheld in Fullilove, both in the percentage chosen and in allowing
4
a waiver where compliance was not possible Thus, the dissenting Juswhich favor minorities
plans
that
tices remained strong in their belief
discrimination.
past
remedy
to
are a permitted means
B. The Constitutionaland Social Issues at Stake
When determining the validity of state and local minority set-aside
programs, the constitutional issue is whether the program survives analysis under the Equal Protection Clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Presumably this amendment, as well as much of the legislative activity
surrounding the end of the Civil War, was designed to enable the newly
85
freed slaves to become integrated into society as free and equal persons. 6
race-neutral.
is
Clause
Protection
However, the language of the Equal
Recognizing this fact, the Supreme Court has closely scrutinized any
87
classification based on race. Thus, the fourteenth amendment applies

to all citizens; it would be just as appropriate for a white contractor as it
would be for a minority contractor to seek equal protection in the process
of procuring government construction projects.
However, applying equal protection to blacks and whites has never
been easy. The main problem has been using strict scrutiny with classifications based on race, while making an exception for race-conscious
affirmative action. Here is where the social issues come into play. It is
no secret that discrimination against minorities, especially blacks, has
been pervasive in this country. Affirmative action programs are supposed
to eradicate this differential treatment, but non-minorities now claim
they are being treated unequally. Of course, equal protection should not
allow reverse discrimination either. So how does society deal with the
83 City of Richmond, 488 U.S. at 536-37 (Marshall, J., dissenting). In order to
have an interest in remedying past discrimination there must be proof. Justice
Marshall felt that Richmond had provided plenty of evidence which came from
the local officials as well as the Congressional findings from Fullilove.Id. at 540-

43.

MId. at 548-51.
See generally, Schnapper, Affirmative Action and The Legislative History of
the FourteenthAmendment, 71 VA. L. REv. 753 (1985). In the Slaughter-House
Cases, Justice Miller stated that "the one pervading purpose" of the reconstruction
amendments was to protect and secure the freedom of the slave race. 83 U.S. (16
Wall.) 36, 71-72 (1873).
'6

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 reads in part as follows:

No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
87See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (white); Yick
Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (Chinese); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100
U.S. 303 (1880) (black).
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reality that minorities are not economically equal due to past discriminatory treatment versus the movement of the Court toward equal treatment regardless of race? Full equality must emphasize individual merit
and opportunity. On the other hand, there must be a commitment to those
discriminated against so that they have a meaningful opportunity to
compete effectively in the marketplace. Keeping this in mind, the following sections will explore the argument for and against set-asides, concluding that City of Richmond is a step in the right direction.
1. Argument of Proponents
Proponents of minority set-asides present two important arguments.
First, they argue that these programs are necessary to rid the construction
industry of the racial discrimination documented by Congress prior to
the enactment of the Public Works Employment Act of 1977.88 Following
Fullilove, many state and local governments, including Richmond,
adopted such plans modeled after the federal program. The concern of
proponents is that these plans will come under judicial attack and programs will be dismissed 9 at a time when minorities have not yet achieved
economic equality.90 This is a legitimate concern for minorities in America, especially blacks. Statistics show that their economic condition is still
behind that of whites.9 ' Proponents have obvious reason to be concerned
- See Brief Amicus Curiae for the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund,
Inc. at 27, City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (No. 87-998),
which states that the principal purpose of set-aside programs is to provide a "fair
opportunity for excluded segments of the community to compete, by compensating
for the competitive disadvantages they face because of their virtual exclusion

from the marketplace." See also Drawing New Battle Lines in the Civil Rights

Fight, The Washington Post, February 19, 1989, at D1, col. 1. Successful black
businessmen point out that minority set-aside programs really do work, perhaps
because it is the only way a minority-owned firm will get a share of public
contracting. They further contend that "the absence of business set-asides inhibits
minority entrepreneurs from even starting out because the odds are against any
new or minority business winning a contract." Id.
See Drawing New Battle Lines In the Civil Rights Fight, The Washington

Post, Feb. 19, 1989, at Dl, col. 1. Only a few days after City of Richmond was
decided, Guilford County, N.C. voted to overturn its minority contract program.
oThe NAACP stresses that the goal should be "economic equilibrium in which
the percentage of minority businesses is roughly equal to the percentage of minorities in the population." Brief Amicus Curiae for the NAACP at 37-38, City
of Richmond (No. 87-998).

91For example, both whites and blacks have increased their hourly wage by
50% from 1979 to 1988. Blacks, however, earn on the average $6.15 per hour as
compared to $6.81 median wages for whites. Black men fare the worst in relation
to white men: $6.94 per hour compared to $8.06 per hour median wages. Black
women, on the other hand, earn $5.61 per hour to $5.86 per hour median wages
for their white counterparts. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTIcs, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR,

BULLETN 2340, HANDBOOK OF LABOR STATISTICS, Table 40 at 160 (August 1989).
See also N.Y. Times, Jan. 20, 1989, at B3, col. 1. The New York Times reported
that a study by the Community Service Society in New York City, a 140-year-

old non-profit advocacy organization, found that in 1986, 80% of those earning
less than $20,000 were black or Hispanic even though employees from those
groups made up 42% of the city's work force.
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with the current conservative Supreme Court because it appears indifferent to remedying the social ills of racial discrimination. Some members
uneasy about the latest conservative approach to
of Congress also seem
92
affirmative action.
A second important argument of proponents is based on the fact that
state and local legislatures are closest to the problems of discrimination
since they are closest to the people they represent. Because the politics
are local, proponents believe that these branches of government are most
likely to represent the wishes of the electorate and that courts should be
reluctant to interfere with the decision-making processes at these levels,
unless individual constitutional rights are at stake. "Local officials, by
virtue of their proximity to, and their expertise with, local affairs, are
exceptionally well qualified to make determinations of public good 'within
93
their respective spheres of authority."'
This argument has merit. Richmond City Council, which passed the
ordinance at a meeting open to public debate, may have been justified in
determining that such a program was necessary. The city used several
94
factors in considering its set-aside program. First, there was a judicially
found history of discrimination in the city with regard to voting and
education. Second, Richmond relied on findings that over the past five
years, less than one percent of public contracts had gone to minorities,
even though minorities made up fifty percent of the population. Third,
few minorities were members of contracting associations. Finally, the city
relied on Congressional findings used to institute the Fullilove plan. In
other words, Richmond argued that it should be left alone by courts as
long as its decisions were supported with sufficient findings.
However, the Supreme Court in City of Richmond concluded that such
state and local government findings are insufficient. For instance, local
must do their
governments cannot rely on Congressional findings; they
95
problem for
The
discrimination.
past
of
history
a
own work in proving
remedying
for
responsible
are
they
that
is
governments
state
and
local
the
discrimination, 96 yet it is being made increasingly difficult for them to
92Rep. Howard Wolpe of Michigan remarked that the City of Richmond decision
"strikes a severe blow to the struggle for racial justice in our country. Affirmative
action efforts such as Richmond's have been indispensable to ongoing efforts to
correct the economic and social inequities which centuries of racial discrimination
have engendered." 135 CONG. REc. E451, Vol. 135, No. 16 (Feb. 22, 1989) (statement of Rep. Wolpe). But see 135 CONG. REC. E2495, Vol. 135, No. 93 (July 13,
1989) (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner) (Congressional action that would overturn the recent Supreme Court decisions goes against everything bargained for
in civil rights-a color-blind society).
93City of Richmond, 488 U.S. at 544 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
See generally, Joint Appendix, City of Richmond (No. 87-998). See also, 488
U.S. at 499-500, 544.
"'Cf. City of Richmond, 488 U.S. at 547 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (city does
not have to conduct new studies or produce independent evidence but can rely
on evidence generated by other cities as long as it is reasonable) (referring to
Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 51-52 (1986)).

16Wygant, 476 U.S. at 291 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in

judgment).
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do so. Cities can least afford to employ personnel to investigate and compile evidence of identified instances where specific acts of discrimination
have taken place.97 Thus, a government agency, while trying to remedy
what it truly believes to be discriminatory practices by implementing
set-asides such as Richmond's, runs the risk of the program being struck
down in court. On the other hand, local governments may do nothing due
to fear of exposing their own past practices.98 However, they then bear a
significant risk of lawsuits from disappointed minorities who feel their
constitutional rights have been infringed.9 Either way the government
will lose, and valuable tax dollars will be spent to defend lawsuits. One
problem with strict scrutiny review of minority set-aside programs is that
it will require the state and local governments to engage in expensive,
detailed fact finding in order to meet the "compelling governmental interest" prong of the analysis. Unless local governments can explicitly
prove discrimination, an agency will not be found to have a "compelling
governmental interest" in implementing a set-aside program.
A further extension of local governments' problems is whether they
have the competency or authority to find and remedy past discrimination. 100 Congress has been found to have broad powers in both these
areas.' 01 State legislatures have also been found to have this power, 10 2

97Brief of The Nat'l League of Cities, U.S. Conference of Mayors, Nat'l Ass'n
of Counties, and Int'l City Management Ass'n as Amici Curiae in Support of
Appellant at 20, City of Richmond (No. 87-998) [hereinafter Brief of the Nat'l
League].
" Such exposure "might not only fuel existing racial tensions, but would expose
[localities] to potential liability for prior discrimination." Brief of the States of
N.Y., Cal., Conn., Ill., Mass., Minn., N.J., Ohio, Or., R.I., S.C., Wash., W. Va.,
Wis., Wyo., and D.C. as Amici Curiae In Support of Appellant at 9, City of Richmond, 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (No. 87-998) [hereinafter Brief of the States].
" Justice O'Connor noted the dilemma faced by public employers. "[They] are
trapped between the competing hazards of liability to minorities if affirmative
action is not taken to remedy apparent employment discrimination and liability
to nonminorities if affirmative action is taken." Wygant, 476 U.S. at 291 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (emphasis in original).
100For a comprehensive discussion of the issue of competency, see Note, Principles of Competence: The Ability of Public Institutions to Adopt Remedial Affirmative Action Plans,53 U. Cm. L. REv. 581 (1986).

101Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 476 (1980). The Chief Justice found
that Congress had the power to enforce equal protection guarantees under § 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Kennedy, however, was troubled with Con-

gress' power as found in Fullilove and the denial of such power to states in City
of Richmond. "The process by which a law that is an equal protection violation
when enacted by a State becomes transformed to an equal protection guarantee
when enacted by Congress poses a difficult proposition for me ... ." City of Richmond, 488 U.S. at 518.
102Ohio Contractors Ass'n v. Keip, 713 F.2d 167, 172 (6th Cir. 1983). See also
Michigan Road Builders Ass'n v. Milliken, 834 F.2d 583 (6th Cir. 1987) (state
may permissibly employ racial classification but must make sufficient findings
that it has discriminated in the past against now favored class).
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and so have cities. 103 Thus, the courts have given cities and states the
green light to go ahead and implement race-conscious policies, but only
after those government units have documented specific acts of discrimination. Presumably, a city may not be aware of how much documentation
is enough until it is tested in court. This leads back to the argument that
cities and states can least afford to engage in massive fact finding suf0
ficient to satisfy an unknown requirement.' Confusion arises where
good-faith council members, like those in Richmond, implement a raceconscious program assuming it will pass judicial scrutiny, only to have
it struck down as unconstitutional.
Cities and states may believe their programs are constitutionally
sound. Yet, the only true test may be in court, since after City of Richmond
all existing minority set-aside programs may be subject to judicial review. 05 Civil rights leaders and good-faith proponents of these plans naturally are concerned that the programs will be abandoned. However, the
following section will point out that despite negative feelings from some
groups, the restructuring of set-aside programs will help move this country toward a state of meaningful equal treatment and bidding on a competitive basis.
2. Argument of Opponents
Those against set-asides propose three major arguments, the most important of which is that the Constitution mandates that equal protection
should be applied without preference for anyone. Thus any government
10 6
classification based on race should be subject to strict scrutiny. Opponents would agree that using this standard in City of Richmond was
appropriate. Forcing a government to have a compelling interest will not
necessarily mean the complete end of race-conscious remedies. Rather, it
will encourage government agencies to examine the facts carefully to
ascertain who has been discriminated against and what remedy would
Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. City and County of San Francisco,
813 F.2d 922 (9th Cir. 1987). "Like the federal government, a state or its political
subdivision has the authority-indeed the 'constitutional duty' ... to ascertain
whether it is denying its citizens equal protection of the laws and, if so, to take
corrective steps." Id. at 929.
supra
104 For the argument from the states' point of view see Brief of the States,
note 98, at 6-10.
10 A detailed listing of existing state and municipal minority business enterprise programs appears in Appendix I and II, Brief of the Nat'l League, supra
note 97.
101See Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 at 291 (opinion of Powell, J.) "[A]II legal restrictions
which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect.
That is not to say that all such restrictions are unconstitutional. It is to say that
courts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny." (quoting Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944)); "[Alny racial classification 'must be justified
by a compelling governmental interest' ... and the means chosen by the State
to effectuate its purpose must be 'narrowly tailored to the achievement of that
goal.'" Wygant, 476 U.S. at 274.
103Associated
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be appropriate. Narrowly tailored programs would hopefully mean that
only those who actually suffered discrimination will receive the remedy.
In turn, innocent parties will not be unduly burdened with any program
preferring others.
To satisfy a compelling governmental interest in apportioning public
contracts on the basis of race, the state or city must identify past discriminatory practices. An example of an adequate finding would be proof
that non-minority contractors systematically excluded minority contractors from subcontracting opportunities. 07 Also, an inference of racially
motivated exclusion could have been found from a "significant statistical
disparity between the number of qualified minority contractors willing
and able to perform ...and the number of such contractors actually
engaged by the locality... ."'0o It is important to note that City of Richmond does not prevent a city from remedying governmental and private
discrimination which is identified, 10 9 but it reaffirms the Court's stance
that only Congress has the power to remedy past societal discrimination;
that is, discrimination not traceable to a specific act or source. Opponents
of set-asides would argue that the Supreme Court should prohibit states
and cities from attempting to ameliorate societal discrimination since
these governments are not in a position to understand and appropriately
remedy this problem. They represent a much smaller and less diverse
constituency than Congress, for instance, and they may be more informal
in their procedures. Thus, they could be more easily influenced by the
local majority.1 0
Not only must the government agency have a "compelling interest,"
but the affirmative action program must also be narrowly tailored to
achieve the goal that the government agency articulates. Here, the Richmond City Council claimed that it was attempting to remedy past discrimination that accounted for the small number of minority contracting
firms in the city."' Yet the ordinance included contractors from all over
the country as well as racial minorities that did not even live in Richmond.
It looked more and more like the city had "other reasons" for enacting

City of Richmond, 488 U.S. at 509.
" Id.Justice O'Connor seemed to indicate that a relevant statistical disparity
would be sufficient evidence for a city to implement a set-aside. But it is questionable whether the statistical disparity would be sufficient to permit the aggrieved plaintiff to move forward with a claim of discrimination. For example,
in Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115, 2125 (1989), a Title
VII action, the Court held that the plaintiff has the burden of isolating and
identifying the employment practices that are responsible for any statistical disparities.
1"488 U.S. at 491-92.
117

110
See Note, supra note 100, at 616.

" See Brief of Appellant City of Richmond at 14, City of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (No. 87-998). Appellant concluded that the City
Council had "abundant reason to conclude that racial discrimination was responsible" for the great disparity in the percentage of contracts awarded and the
percentage of minority population. Id. at 26.
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the ordinance," 2 such as political favoritism based on race. Justice 0'Connor alluded to this possibility by noting that blacks comprise fifty
percent of Richmond's population and hold a majority of the council
seats."13 There is the possibility of a political, or racial, majority acting
to the disadvantage of a minority based on "unwarranted assumptions
or incomplete facts.""14 O'Connor felt this alone was sufficient reason for
subjecting a race-conscious plan to strict scrutiny. Opponents may reason
that the potential for racial politics becomes even more important as the
United States moves into the 1990's, since more racial minorities are
5
being elected to political offices. 1 Courts are just as likely to protest
16
racial favoritism as they are to protest political favoritism.
Two additional factors support the finding that set-asides like Richmond's are not narrowly tailored. First, the city adopted the thirty percent
figure using the same analysis as Congress did in Fullilove. The ten
percent figure justified by Congress fell "roughly halfway between the
present percentage of minority contractors and the percentage of minority
7
group members in the Nation."" The thirty percent figure used by Richmond was approximately halfway between one percent (the percentage
of city contracts awarded to minority contractors over the last five years)
8
and fifty percent (the percentage of minority population in Richmond)."1
While this made more sense for the nationwide remedy, it did not make
any sense for the municipal remedy since it did not take into account the
available number of minority contractors in the city. Thus, the thirty
percent figure was virtually unattainable by using Richmond minority
contractors," 9 forcing prime contractors to look outside the city to meet

12'The random inclusion of racial groups that, as a practical matter, may
never have suffered from discrimination in the construction industry in Richmond, suggests that perhaps the city's purpose was not in fact to remedy past
discrimination." City of Richmond, 488 U.S. at 506.
113 488 U.S. at 495.
114 Id. at 495-96. See also Id. at 516, n.9 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
concurring in judgment). 'The ordinance might be nothing more than a form of
patronage. But racial patronage, like a racial gerrymander, is no more defensible
than political patronage or a political gerrymander."
115See Days, Fullilove, 96 Yale L.J. 453, 479 (1987). See also The Washington
Post, February 19, 1989, at D2, col. 1. Successful black businessmen argue that
other minority racial and ethnic groups have made it in America by just such
political favoritism, why not blacks? Justice Scalia acknowledged that actions
which benefit the dominant political or racial group have occurred in the past,

with blacks usually receiving the injustice. However, "[w]here injustice is the
game ... turn-about is not fair play." City of Richmond, 488 U.S. at 524 (Scalia,

J., concurring).

,,8 Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 542 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
, Id. at 513-14 (Powell, J., concurring).
"8 Brief of Appellant City of Richmond at 46, City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson
Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (No. 87-998).
Il Joint Appendix at 35-36, City of Richmond (1989) (No. 87-998) (remarks of
Patrick Murphy, representative of the American Subcontractors Association).
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the goal for the contract being bid on. Richmond argued that this high
percentage was necessary in order to take into account the fact that
industry discrimination had prevented minorities from participating in
the past. 120 However, it would seem that if the problem was not enough
minorities in the field, the solution would be to get them into the field,
not set aside contracts for those already there. Second, the city haphazardly included the same racial minorities that Congress included in the
Public Works Employment Act of 1977. While blacks, Spanish-speaking
people, Orientals, Indians, Eskimos, and Aleuts are citizens of the entire
United States, the only racial minorities predominantly present in Rich121
mond are blacks.
The second major argument against set-aside programs is the possibility of corruption. Government-backed programs that confer benefits on
the basis of race have the potential for assisting individuals, who through
fraudulent misrepresentations, are undeserving of assistance. 122 Minority
fronts are a predominant form of corruption with set-asides. 123 There are
two potential ways that minority fronts can operate: First, firms actually
owned by whites employ black owners as "fronts." Second, actual minority
contracting firms may win contracts through set-aside programs, and then
broker subcontracts to white-owned firms. 124 Thus, companies may receive
set-aside benefits without being eligible. 12 5 In addition, there is the possibility that a government agency does not monitor the continued certification of true minority firms. Minority fronts and ineligible firms
partaking in these programs lead many to believe that set-asides are
inherently corrupt.
Finally, there is the effect on competition. Set-aside plans like the one
Richmond proposed may force a prime contractor to accept a bid from a
minority firm that did not provide the lowest bid, just to meet the thirty
percent requirement.128 This in turn would raise the cost of the project
to cover the higher subcontractor bid. Either the white prime contractor
must reduce his profit on the project in order to submit a lower overall

120 Brief of the Appellant City of Richmond at 45-46, City of Richmond (No.
87-998).
121 City

of Richmond, 488 U.S. at 506.

122 Levinson, A Study of Preferential Treatment: The Evolution of Minority
Business EnterpriseAssistance Programs,49 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 61, 63 (1980).

123 The most widely publicized abuse of a program designed to assist minority
businesses was the Wedtech scandal. See Wedtech's Story: From Symbol of Hope
to Emblem of Greed, The New York Times, August 5, 1988, at B4, col. 1.
'2A See Set Set-Asides Aside, THE NEW REPUBLIC, May 5, 1986, at 10.
1" "A 1979 internal audit by the Small Business Administration ... revealed
that up to a third of minority firms receiving its set-asides were actually ineligible." Perkins, Creatinga Climate for Black Business, in A CONSERVATIVE AGENDA
FOR BLACK AMEIucANs, 65, 72 (2d ed. J. Perkins ed. 1990) (available from The
Heritage Foundation).
126 Joint Appendix at 31, City of Richmond (No. 87-998) (remarks of Richard

Beck, Richmond contractor).

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol38/iss3/6

18

1990]

THE FUTURE OF MINORITY SET-ASIDE PROGRAMS 505

127
bid, or bid higher on the project. If he ends up being the only contractor
bidding, as was the case with J.A. Croson Company, the city may be
forced to pay the higher cost of the project. Proponents may argue that
this spreads the cost of past discrimination over society. Another way to
look at it is that it may promote monopolistic practices. For instance, if
there is only one minority subcontractor available to do a particular job,
he may submit an inflated bid knowing that the prime contractor must
pick him to meet the thirty percent goal.
Those against set-asides may produce a host of other reasons for abolishing the programs. 128 Yet, society must not forget past discrimination

against blacks and other minorities in the United States. The next section
considers what appears to be the best alternative available after City of
Richmond-race-neutral methods. These proposals have potential if implemented with planning and dedication.

127 Appellee J.A. Croson Co. made a valid argument with regard to the burden
on non-minorities. Noting that the 30% set-aside does not apply to minority prime
contractors, non-minority prime contractors are forced to bid on contracts which
contain uncompetitive bids from minority subcontractors. Minority prime contractors, on the other hand, can seek competitive bids from both minority and
non-minority subcontractors. Brief on Behalf of the Appellee at 29, City of Richmond (No. 87-998).
128Another argument against affirmative action programs of all types lies in
some peoples' perception of the stigma that it perpetuates for the minority. William Bradford Reynolds, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division, 1981
to 1988, remarks:
Minorities suffered the stigma of being selected because of the color of their
skin, not because of the content of their character; those rejected felt the
harsh rebuke of a denial inspired by race, rather than by a competitor's
superior qualifications or performance. Negative preference had wormed its
way into the policy of "affirmative action" and threatened everything sacred
to the American ideal of equality of opportunity.
Reynolds, The Reagan Administration's Civil Rights Policy: The Challenge for
the Future, 42 VAND. L. REv. 993, 995 (1989).
Minority set-asides especially further this feeling in an industry that has been
plagued with problems of discrimination for years. (For a brief discussion of the
history of discrimination against blacks in the construction industry see Brief of
Appellant City of Richmond at 23, n.38, City of Richmond, 488 U.S. 469 (1989)
(No. 87-998)). The white contractor may resent being forced to subcontract to
someone because he is an available black if he feels the minority firm is not
qualified according to his standards. Mark Singer, representative of the Virginia
Chapter of the National Electrical Contractors Association, commented at the
Richmond City Council meeting: "Set-asides tend to posture contractors in such
a way so as to bid jobs that perhaps they really may not be able to perform." Joint
Appendix at 33, City of Richmond (87-998).
Assistant Professor Randall Kennedy of Harvard Law School argues for affirmative action. He feels that the stigmatic effect of affirmative action must be
balanced against the stigmatization that occurs when blacks are absent from
significant positions in society. Placing blacks in important institutional settings
helps the public become accustomed to the idea that blacks should participate
fully in all areas of life. Thus, affirmative action outweighs any stigma that it
may cause. Kennedy, Pursuasionand Distrust: A Comment on the Affirmative
Action Debate, 99 HARv. L. REV. 1327, 1331 (1986).
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3. Race-Neutral Methods
A valid question is whether set-asides really help minorities enter the
construction industry or just help a few successful minority firms remain
successful. 29 There appears to be a consensus that race-neutral barriers
to entry are the reason for low minority participation in the construction
industry. 130 Such barriers include the need to have "specialized knowledge
and experience ...knowledge in operating a successful business and in
appropriate bidding methods and procedures... sufficient working capital ...ability to meet bonding requirements.

..

and establishment of a

track record."'' Minority set-aside programs like Richmond's will set
aside contracts for existing minority firms, but do little to help a new
firm get started. The typical set-aside ordinance as it exists may permit
the established firms to continue in a monopolistic fashion; it will not
concentrate on the obstacles to entry.
Justice O'Connor criticized Richmond for not attempting race-neutral
methods to increase minority business participation in city contracting. 132
A minority firm faces many of the same problems as any other small
business getting started,' 3 yet the failure rate for minority firms is much
higher than for non-minority firms.8 4 Race-neutral methods should concentrate on helping new firms, whether minority or not, enter the industry
and become viable, competitive enterprises. These methods would also
target other potentially disadvantaged groups such as Appalachian
whites, veterans, displaced farmers, or non-established white contractors.
Including these people in a proposed plan may gain greater acceptance
since the emphasis will be on individual merits rather than race-based
group entitlement.
There are several major problems faced by new firms getting started.
First, obtaining financing is a chief concern. 135 Local governments should
concentrate on loan assistance programs, perhaps providing incentives
to gain the cooperation of local banks in providing financial assistance

129Justice Stevens commented that the minority firms most likely to benefit
from set-aside ordinances would be the ones that "have survived in the competitive
struggle, rather than those that have perished." City of Richmond, 488 U.S. at
515 (Stevens, J., concurring). This suggests that set-asides may help perpetuate
a monopoly consisting of the strong minority-owned firms, rather than assisting
new firms in getting started.
,1See Brief of the Associated Specialty Contractors, Inc., Amicus Curiae at 4,
City of Richmond (No. 87-998). See also Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 467 (1980).
,31
Brief of the Associated Specialty Contractors, Inc. at 4, City of Richmond
(No. 87-998).
"82
City of Richmond, 488 U.S. at 507. "If MBEs disproportionately lack capital
or cannot meet bonding requirements, a race-neutral program of city
financing
for small firms would, a fortiori, lead to greater minority participation." Id.
M R. GLOVER, MINORITY ENTERPRISE IN CONSTRUCTION 67 (1977).
134Lowry, supra note 5, at 119. The minority
business failure
over a 30
month period from September 1980 to March 1983 averaged 60%rate
higher than
non-minority business failure.
5
Is
R. GLOVER, supra note 133, at 40.
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to new firms and setting up qualification guidelines not dependent upon
race. Strict bonding requirements also make it difficult for new firms,
especially minority ones, to obtain bonding for government contracting
jobs, since bonding companies are reluctant to deal with unestablished
contractors.136 As Justice O'Connor suggested, relaxed bonding requirecomments (perhaps backed up with government guarantees to bonding
37
panies) would greatly open up the public contracting market.
Another focus should be on the available labor pool. Encouraging apprenticeship programs for minorities and others disadvantaged would
increase the number of skilled workers available. This could be accom38
plished with the cooperation of unions and associations within the construction industry. Knowledge of education and training programs could
be made available to this untapped labor pool through trade139 associations
such as the National Association of Minority Contractors.
Finally, new firms lack management and business skills which enable
14°
them to operate productively and profitably. States and cities can help
in this area. By conducting training seminars, governments can educate
contractors as to the "ins and outs" of getting started with public contracting. Local governments can set up seminars, encouraging participation by contracting associations, banks and bonding companies. James
H. Lowry, a management consultant experienced in minority business
development programs, suggests more private sector involvment, with
4
government incentives such as tax breaks.1 1 He further suggests a complete phaseout of the federal government in these programs, with a phasing in of the private sector over a twenty year period. The private sector
has the capital to invest and their participation "compounds the resources

available for minority ...business development and transfers much of

from the government and into the hands of the
the responsibility away ' 42
free enterprise system.'

" Kilgore, Minority and Women's Business Set-Asides: An AppropriateAffirmative Action Response to Discrimination? in SELECTED AFFIRMATIvE ACTION
Topics IN EMPLOYMENT AND BusiNEss SET-ASIDES, supra note 5, at 141.
117488 U.S. at 510.
138See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979) (Court upheld
voluntary plan between a private employer and a union whereby the employer
reserved 50% of the openings in a training program for black employees).
139The National

Association of Minority Contractors is a nonprofit organization

founded in 1969 to address the needs of small and minority construction contractors. The organization is headquartered in Washington, D.C., and its members
include minority and women general contractors, subcontractors, managers, manufacturers, and suppliers. Thomas, Testimony of the National Association of Minority Contractorsin SELECTED AFFIRMATIVE ACTION TOPICS IN EMPLOYMENT AND
BusiNEss SET-ASIDES, supra note 5 at 237.
R. GLOVER, supra note 133, at 53.
140
141Lowry, supra note 5, at 126.
142
Id.
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IV. AFTER City of Richmond: THE PROPOSED DEATH OF MINORITY SETASIDES

A. Considerationof Existing Programs
The principles espoused in City of Richmond have already begun to
work their way through the lower courts. It appears the future is bleak
for minority set-asides as they currently exist. An examination of the
first few lower court cases after City of Richmond will give an indication
as to how present programs stack up against strict scrutiny analysis. This
information will assist state and local governments as they prepare to
revamp existing programs.
The Georgia Supreme Court was one of the first to strike down a minority set-aside program after City of Richmond in American Subcontractors Association v. City of Atlanta.143 The plaintiff in that case
challenged a minority and female business enterprise ordinance'" instituted by the City of Atlanta, alleging violation of the equal protection
clause of the Georgia state constitution. 14 5 The court applied the strict
scrutiny analysis set forth in City of Richmond and Wygant; that is,
whether there was sufficient evidence of past discrimination to enable
the city to have a compelling governmental interest and whether the
program was narrowly tailored. 146
Under the first prong of the strict scrutiny test, the Georgia Supreme
Court examined the evidence offered by Atlanta, and was unable to find
a compelling government interest. The city had relied upon two studies,
a 1977 U.S. Department of Commerce study, and a Voter Education Project study on discrimination against black-owned businesses in Georgia. 147
However, the court ruled this evidence did not support specific discrimination against black contractors in Atlanta; rather, it represented general societal discrimination. In addition, witnesses for the city suggested
there were non-racial reasons why there were few black contractors.'"

14 259 Ga. 14, 376 S.E.2d 662 (1989).

'" The ordinance covered contracts of $25,000 or more. In addition, the plan
did not have an expiration date (such as Richmond's ordinance, which expired
within five years of its inception), there was no geographical limit, and waivers
were permitted if a good faith effort failed to achieve stated goals. American
Subcontractors Ass'n v. City of Atlanta, 259 Ga. 14, 14-15, 376 S.E.2d 662, 663
(1989). In addition, the percentage goal was to be set by the mayor, who declared
the 1985 goal to be 35%. Id. at 16, 376 S.E.2d at 663.
14 The Georgia state constitution provides: "Protection to person and property
is the paramount duty of government and shall be impartial and complete. No
person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws." Id. at 16, 376 S.E.2d at
663 (quoting GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, cl. 2).
14Id. at 17, 376 S.E.2d at 664.
147
Id. at 18, 376 S.E.2d at 665.

14 Id. Interestingly enough, the city's Minority Participation Report boasted
that MBEs participated in 29% of all city contracts in 1980 and 41.3% in 1981,
thus causing the court to question the real need for this kind of program. Id.
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Nor did Atlanta's program pass the second prong of strict scrutiny; the
program was not narrowly tailored to remedy the alleged discrimination.1 49 Just like the Richmond statute, Atlanta's statute was not linked
to identified acts of discrimination. In addition, there was no attempt at
race-neutral methods, such as improving city purchasing and payment
procedures or providing loan assistance. These methods would make sense
since witnesses for the city testified that problems encountered by miracial, but linked to the usual probnority contractors were not primarily
150
profession.
the
into
lems of entry
Another minority set-aside program was struck down in Cone Corp. v.
5
Hillsborough County. ' Hillsborough County, Florida, implemented an
MBE plan that required an annual goal of twenty-five percent minority
and female participation on projects greater than $100,000.152 The pro-

gram also included a waiver if good faith efforts failed to produce the
requisite percentage of minority or female participation. The plaintiffs
brought suit alleging discrimination pursuant to this MBE program.
The district court followed the City of Richmond analysis, and once
again a set aside program failed the strict scrutiny test set out by the
Supreme Court. 153 The opinion stated, "[iun many instances this Court
could substitute the words 'Hillsborough County' for the words 'City of
Richmond' or 'Richmond' in the Croson decision and have a true and
1
relevant statement.'

54

The court felt that the program should have been

suspended earlier and money used to work on a new program which would
155
conform to the Supreme Court's guidelines.
Finally, the U.S. Supreme Court vacated and remanded another setaside challenge in light of City of Richmond. In H.K. Porter Co. v. Metropolitan Dade County, 56 the Eleventh Circuit had upheld a county minority set-aside program requiring five percent minority participation in
the award of a federal construction contract for Miami's transportation
system. H.K. Porter was the low bidder on the project, yet Dade County
awarded the project to the next lowest bidder based on an affirmative
action plan. 157 The plan was instituted as a result of a Congressional
l
statute, the Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1978, 15 which re159
quired affirmative action efforts in order to receive federal funding.
'19American Subcontractors Ass'n,

259 Ga. at 19, 376 S.E.2d at 666.

1I0d.

151723 F. Supp. 669 (M.D.Fla. 1989).

152Cone Corp. v. Hillsborough County, 723 F. Supp. 669, 674 (M.D.Fla. 1989).
The County also instituted a set-aside provision whereby specific projects less
than $100,000 may be available for bid only by disadvantaged and minority
Id. at 675.
groups.
3
at 678.
1
1 Id.
5Id.
155 Id.
156825 F.2d 324 (l1th Cir. 1987), vacatedand remanded, 109 S. Ct. 1333 (1989).
157Id. at

325.

158 Pub.L. No. 95-599, 92 Stat. 2689 (1978).
159To facilitate an initiative encouraging the participation of minority businesses in federal programs, grantees of the Surface Transportation Act "were
required to establish written affirmative action plans which included percentage
goals for minority business participation." H.K. Porter,825 F.2d at 325.
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Accordingly, Dade County's bid invitation included a requirement of five
percent minority participation. H.K. Porter subsequently filed suit alleging that the five percent goal was unconstitutional. 160
The Eleventh Circuit relied on Fullilove and the broad remedial powers
of Congress in concluding that the Department of Transportation had
authority to promulgate the MBE program in question. 161 In addition, the
court applied the two-prong Wygant test and found a compelling governmental interest 162 and narrow means.'6 H.K. Porter Co. argued that the
five percent figure was unconstitutional because it was not based on any
study or findings. While the court expressed concern about the lack of
findings and support, it nevertheless upheld the plan since courts had
upheld programs with much higher goals, such as the ten percent goal
in Fullilove.6 4 H.K. Porter is significant in that the Supreme Court's
remand appears to question a federal mandate that requires affirmative
action. Thus, it may be that a local government's ability to rely on
Congressional findings or efforts to remedy past discrimination is now
being questioned. 165
City of Richmond is forcing many state and local government agencies
to reevaluate their minority business enterprise programs, either voluntarily or through litigation.66 In addition, City of Richmond principles
are affecting other areas where discrimination is being alleged. 167 It will
'61 Id. at 327.
161Id. at 329.
- A compelling government interest was found based on several factors. First,
Dade County was acting pursuant to Congress' compelling interest in eradicating
past discrimination against minorities in the industry. H.K. PorterCo., 825 F.2d
at 330. Second, the remedy appeared to be temporary. Id. Finally, a waiver provision was included. Id. at 331.
6 The court found that the county was not required to make additional findings
of past discrimination regarding the awarding of this project. "Congress was
concerned about a national problem. Its findings provide adequate support for
such local projects." 825 F.2d at 331. Cf City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488
U.S. 469 (1989) (congressional findings inadequate to support local ordinance
requiring minority set-aside goals).
H.K. Porter,825 F.2d at 332.
,65 But see Milwaukee County Pavers Ass'n v. Fiedler, 731 F. Supp. 1395
(W.D.Wis. 1990) (district court found that states can rely on congressional findings
underlying the Surface Transportation Act of 1987).
- See S.C. Att'y Gen. Op., June 15, 1989 (factual determinations are critical
to determine the validity of South Carolina's new set-aside program); 89-6-3 Iowa
Att'y Gen. Op., June 9, 1989 (suspended state minority set-aside program until
further reviewed by legislature); Main Line Paving Co. v. Board of Educ., 725
F.Supp. 1349 (E.D.Pa. 1989) (school board's minority set-aside program found to
violate the Equal Protection Clause); Engineering News-Record, Sept 7, 1989, at
5 (Maryland Highway Contractors Association filed suit asking for preliminary
injunction to enjoin state from enforcing MBE law).
117 See Mann v. City of Albany, 883 F.2d 999 (11th Cir. 1989)
(remand to lower
court in light of City of Richmond to determine whether white job applicant had
viable claim of reverse discrimination based on city's promotion of black applicant); Winter Park Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 873 F.2d 347 (D.C. Cir. 1989),

affd 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990) (finding City of Richmond not applicable, court held
FCC's use of qualitative enhancement for minority ownership in awarding broadcasting licenses did not violate equal protection).
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take some time before the details are worked out in the lower courts; in
the meantime, the question is what will constitute a valid affirmative
action plan to assist minorities and others disadvantaged in public contracting?
B. Successful Future Programs
State and local government agencies must now make decisions regarding existing MBE programs.'6 Routinely following the plan approved
in Fullilove is no longer a sound course. Nor are waivers or durational
limits sufficient to assure that a program will be sustained. Because raceneutral approaches are preferred, a government agency has several factors to consider if it insists upon using a race-conscious program.
First, it is obvious that the agency must adequately identify and support
findings of discrimination and not try to remedy general societal discrim16 9
ination. Relevant statistics can be helpful, but they should not be relied
upon to tell the whole story. If racial discrimination is found, the plan
must then narrowly define who is to benefit. This definition may require
placing geographical boundaries upon those minorities getting preference
and carefully limiting the benefit to those racial groups who were discriminated against. 170 In a related area, a government agency should be
7
1
careful not to rely on stereotypical attitudes when formulating plans.1
instead
goal
a
percentage
set-aside
Second, merely calling a minority
172
of a quota will be insufficient. It is better to avoid percentages, but if
one is used, it must be relevant. For example, in Ohio Contractors As-

There are several criticisms of present set-aside plans. First, many programs
have been privately adopted and were not subjected to public deliberation and
debate. Second, many plans were hastily put together in an effort to "do something," without identifying the problem or examining alternative remedies. Third,
when confronted with court challenges to these plans, proponents have defended
them in unqualified terms instead of attempting to separate the good plans from
the bad ones. Days, supra note 115, at 458-59.
1-

1-9

Justice O'Connor compared Richmond's plan with the plan upheld in Ohio

Contractors Ass'n v. Keip, 713 F.2d 167 (6th Cir. 1983), noting that Richmond
did not even know how many MBEs were qualified, whereas in Ohio Contractors
Ass'n, the State compared the percentage of minority businesses in the state to
the percentage of state contracts awarded to minority firms. City of Richmond,
488 U.S. at 502.
170 For example, Justice O'Connor points out that Richmond may never even
have had an Aleut or Eskimo citizen. 488 U.S. at 506. Presumably, it would not
make sense for Richmond to give a preference for these groups.
171 See, e.g., Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. City and County of San
Francisco, 813 F.2d 922, 933 (9th Cir. 1987) (supporters of plan could not prove,
nor would the court assume, that "male caucasian contractors will award contracts
only to other male caucasians").
172Benna Ruth Solomon, who filed an amicus brief in City of Richmond on
behalf of Richmond, representing the National Governors Association, the United
States Conference of Mayors, and the National League of Cities, stated that "some
governors and mayors who distinguished between 'goals' and 'quotas' might be
deluding themselves about the effects of the decision." The New York Times, Jan.
25, 1989, at A18, col. 3.
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sociation v. Keip, 17 3 the State of Ohio looked to a study done by a task
force set up by the Ohio Attorney General. The study found that while
minority businesses constituted seven percent of all Ohio businesses, they
received less than one-half of one percent of all state purchase contracts.1 7 4
Therefore, the Ohio General Assembly provided that in state contracts,
the general contractor must subcontract five to seven percent of the total
value of the contract to certified minority businesses. 175
Third, the agency must have the competence, or the authority, to find
and remedy past discrimination.176 Federal, state, and city legislatures
will be found to have this competence; administrative agencies 177 or

mayors 17 may not. Courts and Congress have constitutional authority to
find and remedy discrimination. 79 Other government agencies may be
found competent if they have been delegated remedial power from another
government body which itself has constitutional authority.1 0 In addition,
not only must the agency have the authority to remedy discrimination,
but the governing body must be careful not to violate any other existing
statutes or ordinances.'"
Fourth, a somewhat controversial consideration is whether minorities
comprise a majority of the cities' population or political leadership. Plans
in areas where this is the case may be looked at more carefully as suggested by Justice O'Connor.182 Of course, this assumes that all majority
decisions which favor the majority are suspect, even though there may
83

be no basis in fact for this assumption.1
173713 F.2d 167
74
1 Id. at 171.

(6th Cir. 1983).

171 Id. at 169. See also Janowiak v. Corporate City of South
Bend, 836 F.2d
1034 (7th Cir. 1987) (evidence of statistical disparity to support affirmative action
plan must establish an imbalance between the relevant qualified area labor pool

and the employer's work force).
17I See generally Note, supra note 100.
17'The

Board of Regents of the Medical School of the University of California

at Davis was found not to have this competence. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v.

Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 309-10 (1978). Similarly, the district court in S. J. Groves
& Sons Co. v. Fulton County found that the Department of Transportation is "an
administrative agency whose authority is much more limited and whose procedures are subject to much more scrutiny than are the power and procedures of
Congress." 696 F. Supp. 1480, 1490 (N.D.Ga. 1987).
178See American Subcontractors Ass'n v. City of Atlanta, 259 Ga. 14, 17 n.5,
376 S.E.2d 662,664 n.5 (1989) (mayor had no mandate to enact a minority business

program).
179See Note, supra note 100, at 600.
180Id. For example, in Bakke, the Board of Regents did not have authority to
implement affirmative action plans because the California legislature had not
delegated the power to the Board. Id.
"I See, e.g., Georgia Branch, Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of

Atlanta, 253 Ga. 397,321 S.E.2d 325 (1984) (ordinance requiring certain contracts

be awarded on the basis of race or sex conflicts with ordinance requiring "lowest
and/or best bidder").
City of Richmond, 488 U.S. at 495-96.
103See Rosenfeld, Decoding Richmond: Affirmative Action and the Elusive
Meaning of ConstitutionalEquality, 87 MICH. L. REv. 1729 (1989). The author

argued that Justice O'Connor's conclusion was not supported by facts; and even
if it were, it would be valid only at an abstract level.
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Finally, and most importantly, race-neutral means must be used first.
Since there is consensus that problems such as financing, bonding and
insurance are barriers to entry into construction, an agency should focus
on these areas. These problems can be addressed using race-neutral methods discussed earlier. As a corollary, governments must make sure they
do not perpetuate their own past discriminatory practices. For example,
effort must be made to be certain all contractors have equal access to
1
potential contracts for bidding, 84 with periodic monitoring in place. Also,
reducing government regulations and accompanying paperwork would
make it easier for small and minority businesses to operate since their
185
overhead would be decreased.
A 1986 study 86 of 120 municipal minority business development plans
found several faults with existing programs. Most cities recognized that
minority contractors needed assistance to take advantage of public contracting opportunities. While initial efforts focused on estimating, bidding, and certification of legitimate minority firms, little attention was
7
assistance.8
paid to providing more in-depth technical and managerial
In addition, qualified minority firms were not participating for reasons
such as lack of awareness of the program's existence, intent of the program, or how to access available resources.'8 Successful municipal programs were the ones that have determined the needs of the minority
estabbusiness community, identified and coordinated resources, 18and
9
objectives.
program
lished policies and procedures to achieve
V. PROPOSED RACE-NEUTRAL MODEL STATUTE

A set-aside should only be used when there are actual identified victims
of a discriminatory practice and the degree and type of harm is measurable. 90 While the conclusions in the prior section should be considered
if a race-conscious remedy is implemented, the preferred method for a
government agency to assist businesses in the contract procurement process would be race-neutral measures. The following municipal model statute is offered as a suggestion:

184Days, supra note 115, at 481. Other perpetuation practices by governments

are "preselection before the formal advertising process and the excercise of dis-

cretion by government procurement officers to disfavor minority businesses." Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 467 (1980) (Burger, C.J., citing a report by The

Civil Rights Commission).
'- Sroka, Minority and Women's Business Set-Asides: An AppropriateResponse
to Discrimination?in SELECTED AFFIRMATIVE ACTION Topics IN EMPLOYMENT AND
BusiNEss SET-ASIDES, supra note 5, at 103.
186U.S. Conference of Mayors & U.S. Dep't of Commerce, 1986 National City
Profiles: Report on Minority EnterpriseDevelopment Programs.
117Id. at 4.
'8 Id. at 8.
B9 Id. at 7.
-9 See Kilgore, supra note 136. at 133.
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§ 1-101: All contracts shall be awarded on the basis of competitive sealed bidding, with the contract awarded to the lowest
responsive bidder in compliance with municipal requirements.
No contract shall be awarded on the basis of race, sex, religion,
ethnic or national origin, or other criteria irrelevant to the
competitive bidding process.
§ 2-101: There is hereby established a Municipal Procurement
Commission appointed by the Mayor to implement regulations
and procedures of the contract procurement process. The Commission shall include members of the business community who
are experienced in the needs of small or disadvantaged businesses.
§ 3-101: The Commission shall establish regulations to implement a program of assistance for small and disadvantaged businesses in learning how to effectively do business with the city.
A disadvantaged business is a small business owned or controlled by persons who have been denied the opportunity to
obtain technical, business, or financial assistance because of
social or economic disadvantages. A small business is one which
is independently owned and operated and which employs less
than 50 full-time employees. The Commission shall establish
further guidelines as to which businesses will qualify as small
or disadvantaged.
§ 3-102: The responsibilities of the Commission shall include,
but are not limited to:
(1) assisting small and disadvantaged businesses in learning
how to do business with the city, including procurement,
bidding, financing and qualification procedures;
(2) developing and actively circulating information publications to small and disadvantaged businesses;
(3) maintaining and circulating lists of small and disadvantaged businesses to prime contractors to encourage subcontracting opportunities for such businesses; and,
(4) developing training programs, workshops, and seminars
enlisting the assistance of the private sector whenever possible to aid small and disadvantaged businesses in issues
such as financing, bonding, insurance, accounting, management, and other technical assistance.
§ 3-103: The Commission shall meet regularly to discuss problems, develop strategies, and review procedures and regulations pertaining to the small and disadvantaged business
program, including the continued qualification of successful
businesses.
This model is based on existing statutes.19' What makes it different is
191Reference was made to the A.B.A., MODEL PROCUREMENT CODE § 11-101
(Feb. 1979); IND. CODE ANN. § 4-13-16.5-1 (West Supp. 1989); ARiz. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 41-1001, -2651, -2652 (1985); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 4-26-102, -103 (1989
Supp.).
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92
that there is no mention of a goal, quota, or set-aside.' Skeptics may
argue that such an approach is a watered-down effort to deal with racial
discrimination. But such approaches are already being implemented by
some government agencies in conjunction with their set-aside percentages.' 9 3 Of course, establishing training and education programs may be
more expensive and time consuming than merely checking compliance
with a pre-set percentage. If such a program is to work, it will need
rigorous enforcement and dedication from individuals within the agency.
Perhaps little will change with the implementation of race-neutral
programs. It may be that minorities will remain the primary beneficiaries.
There is nothing wrong with that result. The important fact is that no
one will be excluded from participation because they are not the right
color. No matter what the outcome, it appears the Supreme Court has
committed governments to attempting race-neutral approaches and this
is the current standard under which we must live.

VI. CONCLUSION

"The civil rights movement has turned away from its original principled
campaign for equal justice under law to engage in an open contest for
social and economic benefits conferred on the basis of race or other classifications previously thought to be invidious." 194 Minority set-asides are

A local government must be careful how it defines a "disadvantaged business." For example, Philadelphia amended its municipal code to provide for in192

creased participation in city contracting of "disadvantaged business enterprises"
(DBEs). DBEs were defined as businesses owned at least 51% by socially or
economically disadvantaged individuals who were described as "individuals subjected to racial, sexual, or ethnic prejudice because of their identity as a member
of a group without regard to their individual qualities." However, the city maintained the same percentage participation goals for minorities and women as were
required under the old code. The district court struck down the ordinance, finding
that the DBE concept was merely camouflage for a race and gender based ordinance. Contractors Ass'n of Eastern Pa. v. City of Philadelphia, Civil Action No.
89-2737 (E.D.Pa., April 5, 1990).
93For example, the Maine Department of Transportation has implemented a
program designed to increase participation from certain groups. See MAINE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, DISADVANTAGED BuSINESS ENTERPRISE, MINORITY
BUSINESS ENTERPRISE, WOMEN BUSINESS ENTERPRISE PROGRAM (1989) (on file with
the author). Even though the department adopted a goal of ten percent for 1989,
it is committed to providing technical assistance (including seminars, workshops,
books, pamphlets and consulting services) designed to assist women and minority
businesses. See also CITY OF CLEVELAND, PROCEDURES RELATING To MBE AND
FBE PARTICIPATION IN CITY CONTRACTS (on file with the author). The Mayor's
Office of Equal Opportunity in Cleveland, Ohio provides management and technical assistance in the areas of financing, planning and marketing. The program,
however, is targeted specifically to women and minority participation.
11Abram, Affirmative Action: FairShakers and Social Engineers,99 HARv. L.
REv. 1312, 1312 (1986).
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a prime example of this turning away. By apportioning benefits on the
basis of race, these programs have further divided society into a system
where principles of individual merit have been eroded. 195
As this Note has argued, a restructuring of current minority set-aside
programs is necessary. Recent court decisions such as City of Richmond
have helped to move this country back to the basics of the civil rights
movement; that is, equal opportunity for all, regardless of race. A new
civil rights agenda advocates minority skill improvement, basic education, and encouragement of self-help,19 6 rather than government setasides, welfare, and quotas. The race-neutral methods emphasized in this
Note and in the City of Richmond decision advocate these same values.
The past two decades have proven that existing government programs
197
are ineffective in producing economic equality between the races. It is

time now to concentrate on programs that allow an individual to become
equipped to compete efficiently in the marketplace, regardless of race.
JUDY KERCZEWSKI KRANJC

19 The district court in Georgia summed up one of the problems with affir-

mative action: "Agency-imposed discrimination bypasses the original problems
and creates its own new problems, including encouraging citizens to classify
themselves and others in terms of their race rather than their individual merit."

S.J. Groves & Sons Co. v. Fulton County, 696 F. Supp. 1480, 1494 (N.D.Ga. 1987).
I See generally, Woodson, Race and Economic Opportunity, 42 VAMD. L. Rv.
1017 (1989). See also C. BOLICK, CHANGING COURSE: CIL RIGHTS AT THE CROSSROADS 92-121 (1988).
191C. BOLICK, supra note 196, at 115 (1988). In fact, "80% of black progress
between 1940-80 was made before 1965-before racial preferences, before massive
busing, before skyrocketing welfare spending." Id. at 85 (footnotes omitted, emphasis in original).
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